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The potential of European student mobility to promote a European identity and, 
consequently, European integration has long been stressed by transactionalists 
such as Karl Deutsch but was never tested empirically. The EU-funded exchange 
programme ERASMUS moves more than 150,000 university students annually, 
and it is still widely assumed it plays a pivotal role in the promotion of a European 
identity. Based on the results of a longitudinal survey among ERASMUS and non-
mobile students I show that reality meets only partly these expectations. Whilst 
ERASMUS enables students to improve their foreign language skills and learn 
more about other European countries, it does not foster a European self-identity or 
a sense of European pride. However, the ERASMUS experience does help British 
students to feel more attached to Europe and to acknowledge they have things in 
common with continental Europeans. 
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Does ERASMUS Student Mobility Promote a European Identity? 
INTRODUCTION
∗
Forty-four years ago Arend Lijphart was urging researchers to collect and analyse 
data, in order to study the contribution of European student mobility to European 
integration (1964: 252). Behind this open call lay the popular assumption that 
personal contact with people of other nationalities can improve international relations 
and facilitate political integration. Compared to economic migrants, Lijphart 
continued, university students are more likely to engage in ‘intensive’ personal 
contact with the locals and, furthermore, they ‘belong to the more influential segments 
                                                 
∗ My thanks go to two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments, to my former supervisor Dr 
Jonathan Golub and to Dr Spyros Blavoukos for commenting on an earlier version of the paper. 
  1of society’ (ibid.) implying that a supranational identity is likely to spread beyond the 
narrow confines of the student community. 
Lijphart’s premise draws on Karl Deutsch’s theory, according to which increased 
cross-border people mobility is one of the essential conditions for the success of 
international integration and the formation of a ‘we-feeling’ among different peoples 
(Deutsch et al., 1968). If we take into account that living abroad is more likely to have 
a greater impact on one’s personality the younger one is, it comes as no surprise that 
European student mobility is widely seen as an instrument that promotes a common 
European identity (e.g. Fligstein, 2008; Green, 2007; Wallace, 1990).  
For over twenty years now the European Union (EU) has been systematically 
promoting student mobility within Europe. Through the ‘European Action Scheme for 
the Mobility of University Students’ (ERASMUS), the largest student exchange 
programme in Europe, nearly two million students have studied abroad and had the 
opportunity to learn firsthand about other European peoples and cultures. In spite of 
the widely acknowledged potential of the study abroad experience to instil a European 
identity among students, there have been no reliable empirical studies measuring its 
actual effect on European identity. In this paper I address this gap by measuring 
longitudinally the attitudes of two groups of ERASMUS students, and comparing 
them with those of a sedentary group of students. The results show the ERASMUS 
experience helps university students improve their foreign language skills and their 
knowledge of other European countries, but produces mixed results with regard to a 
European identity. Drawing on a series of paired sample t-tests I argue that the 
ERASMUS outcome depends less on students’ original attitudes and more on the 
choice of the host country.   
 
 
THE QUEST FOR A EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
Every time European integration stumbles upon a referendum that prevents the 
ratification of a new treaty, arguments about the democratic deficit of the EU, its 
legitimacy problems and the absence of a European demos become popular again. 
Legitimacy refers to the right to exercise political power (Gilley, 2006), and is 
necessary for the long-term stability and viability of any polity including the EU.
1  Up 
                                                 
1 For a detailed analysis of the concept of legitimacy see Connolly (1984) and Beetham (1991). 
  2to this day the EU derives its legitimacy primarily from the member states who give it 
a mandate to exercise power in a semi-autonomous fashion. Since national 
governments are democratically elected, the EU is indirectly legitimated by the 
citizens of the member states.  
Whilst for some scholars indirect legitimacy is sufficient for the purposes of the 
EU (Crombez, 2003; Moravcsik, 2002; Zweifel, 2002), for the majority it is deemed 
inadequate (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006; Mather, 2006; Decker, 2002; Habermas 2001; 
Lord & Beetham, 2001). Several academics have argued that at least part of the EU’s 
legitimacy deficit is due to the lack of a European identity (e.g. Etzioni, 2007; Green, 
2007; Decker, 2002; Howe, 1995). Unlike its member states, the EU can not appeal to 
its citizens’ affections for unconditional support in times of severe crisis; neither can 
it inspire a sense of belonging to the same polity (Beetham & Lord, 1998).
2 Equally, 
there is no myth of a shared past or destiny behind the life and work of the EU 
(Obradovic, 1996). 
Defining European identity has proved notoriously difficult and controversial, not 
least because it can pre-empt the feasibility of such an identity. For instance, if we 
conceive European identity of simply being a national identity writ large, then we 
automatically stumble upon the lack of a single historic homeland, of a mass public 
culture and of a European myth that does not clash with the national ones (Smith, 
1995). If, on the other hand, we view European identity as something completely new 
and unlike the existing national identities (e.g. Kantner, 2006), placing the emphasis 
on diversity rather than unity, we run the risk to come up with an understanding of 
collective identity that may be too thin to legitimate the EU (Mather, 2006). It is not 
my intention to contribute to this debate here, but to explain why I opted for a 
definition of European identity that while it may not find everyone in agreement, it 
has been used extensively by other political scientists before me. 
According to the social identity theory, developed by Henri Tajfel in the 1970s, 
‘social identity [is] understood as that part of an individual’s self-concept which 
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance to that membership’ (1978: 63). Hence, 
European would be someone who identifies oneself as such and attaches emotional 
significance to this identity. Investing the self-identity component with a certain 
                                                 
2 On the notion of affective or diffuse support see Easton (1965). 
  3emotional value is important, because some people will call themselves European 
only to state they were born in Europe. Feeling proud to be European, just like one 
may feel proud to be French, Bulgarian or Swedish, implies European identity is of 
certain importance to the individual. A definition of European identity based on self-
identity and pride has proved particularly popular among empirical political scientists 
(e.g. Fligstein, 2008; Green 2007; McLaren, 2006; Niedermayer & Sinnot, 1995), and, 
perhaps more importantly, it has been used in the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys, 
admittedly irregularly, between 1992 and 2006.  
Another measure of European identity that has been used in the EB surveys, and 
which I also use here, is to what extent people feel attached to Europe as a whole. 
This understanding of European identity also draws from the nation-state paradigm; it 
implies people feel a special attachment to their homeland which makes sacrifices for 
one’s country conceivable. By analogy, strong feelings of attachment to Europe 
would imply the existence of a European homeland for which people maintain a 
special position in their hearts.
3
  Unfortunately for the EU, the EB surveys indicate European attachment is 
substantially lower than national attachment. Similarly, European pride is weaker than 
national pride, whereas only a minority of Europeans identify themselves firstly as 
Europeans and only secondly as nationals of their own country (Green, 2007; 
McLaren, 2006).
4 Given that a common identity would enhance the legitimacy of the 
EU and allow Europe to integrate further, it is not surprising the European 
Commission has an interest in fostering a popular European identity (Shore, 2000). In 
the present socio-political context, however, it is impossible to create a European 
identity through a standardised Europe-wide education or other methods borrowed 
from the nationalist toolkit. Such attempts would not only be met with fierce 
opposition but they would also undermine instead of strengthening the EU. If, 
however, a European identity could emerge semi-spontaneously from below, it would 
be far less provocative and more fruitful, which is why it is worthwhile to re-visit Karl 
Deutsch’s theory of international integration. 
                                                 
3 Of course, people feel attached to smaller geo-political units, such as towns or regions, as well. 
However, in all EB surveys national attachment has proved considerably stronger than either local or 
regional attachment suggesting that national identity is stronger than sub-national forms of 
identification. 
4 Although a European and national identity need not be in sharp contrast with each other, there is little 
doubt that a strong pan-European identity overshadowing the national ones would help resolve 
problems arising from conflicting loyalties. 
  4 
 
PEOPLE MOBILITY AND INTERNATIONAL CONTACT: A European 
identity from below? 
According to Deutsch et al. (1968), international integration is a dynamic process 
which largely depends on international transactions. The latter take different forms 
ranging from international trade and capital flows to labour migration, student 
mobility, tourism, mail exchanges and other types of international exchanges. What is 
important is that these transactions will create multiple networks of communication 
between individuals and institutions which may lead to the formation of a ‘we-
feeling’ and, consequently, to a ‘pluralistic’ or ‘amalgamated security community’ 
(Puchala, 1981).
5
Of the different forms of international transactions Deutsch et al. (1968) 
highlighted the significance of cross-border people mobility. They claimed that their 
‘finding of the importance of the mobility of persons suggests that in this field of 
politics persons may be more important than either goods or money’ (ibid., p. 54), 
while limited mobility of persons ‘is a serious deterrent to further [integration] 
progress’, (ibid., p. 154). Cross-border people mobility implies the opportunity of 
personal contact with individuals of different nationalities and cultures which is 
‘probably the most efficient and permanent method of gaining knowledge about 
human actions and values…’ (Deutsch et al., 1968: 170). Thus, in theory, the more 
people cross the borders to visit, study, work and live in other European countries, the 
better the prospects for a European identity. 
The idea that personal inter-cultural contacts helps to overcome national 
prejudices, rectify stereotypes and bring peoples closer is so widespread that it is not 
surprising Deutsch adopted it. However, labour and tourist mobility do not 
necessarily yield meaningful communication between the newcomers and the local 
population. In the early days of the European Economic Community (EEC) Feldstein 
(1967) noted that the presence of migrant workers from other EEC countries makes 
communication between Europeans possible but not necessary. On the contrary, 
                                                 
5 Amalgamated security community refers to ‘the formal merger of two or more previously 
independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation’ 
Deutsch et al. (1968: 6). In the pluralistic security community member states have become integrated, 
that is, they have attained a ‘sense of community’, institutions and practices strong enough to ensure 
peaceful changes over long periods of time, but they retain their own independent governments (ibid., 
pp. 5-6). 
  5Feldstein argued, it is quite conceivable they will remain complete strangers, even if 
they live in the same neighbourhood. Similarly, Connor (1972) criticised Deutsch for 
excessive optimism in his prediction that increased mobility and contact will lead to a 
‘we-feeling’, whereas Marks (1999) highlighted the importance of intervening factors 
between personal interactions and European identity. 
Social psychologists have long been preoccupied in determining the conditions 
under which a positive outcome in inter-group encounters is more likely. In 1954 
Gordon Allport, a Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, identified four such 
conditions. He argued that  
 
[p]rejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the 
individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and 
minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly 
enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by 
law, custom, or legal atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to 
the perception of common interests and common humanity between 
members of the two groups. (Allport, 1954: 281). 
 
The original contact hypothesis was followed by a number of empirical studies 
resulting in an increase over the years in the number of the favourable contact 
conditions.
6 Pettigrew (1998: 65), however, criticised ‘writers [who] overburden the 
hypothesis with facilitating, but not essential, conditions’. Instead he insisted on the 
importance of the original four conditions and added the opportunity to become 
friends with members of the other group as another essential condition. 
The favourable background conditions during the inter-group contact are more 
likely to hold in the case of European student mobility rather than that of labour or 
tourist mobility. Young Europeans who study abroad are of equal status with their 
host country peers, they share the same goals, they have common interests, they enjoy 
the support of their host university and, finally, there is clearly a potential for the 
development of international friendships. However, personal contact is not the only 
means of social learning. While abroad, students are exposed to a series of stimuli 
from their host environment which may involve little, if any, personal contact. For 
instance, students learn about their host country from watching television, reading the 
newspapers and travelling within the country.  
                                                 
6 Stephen (1985) identified as many as thirteen conditions. For a literature review and the historical 
origins of the contact hypothesis see Ward et al. (2001) and Pettigrew (1998). 
  6The EU has played an indispensable role in promoting student mobility within 
Europe. The rulings of the European Court of Justice played their part by forcing the 
Member State authorities to stop the discrimination between national and EU students 
in terms of tuition fees and diploma recognition. As a result, studying full-time in 
another EU country is easier than ever before. The focus of this paper, though, is on 
short-term EU student mobility through the EU-funded ERASMUS programme. 
Although some of the findings may apply to both categories of mobile students, full-
time students stay for several years abroad which inevitably requires a different 
methodology than the one employed here. 
 
 
THE ERASMUS PROGRAMME 
The exchange programme ERASMUS was launched in 1987 and enables students 
and teachers to spend a period of up to one year at a university of an EU country other 
than their own. Initially ERASMUS was a self-standing programme, but after 1995 it 
came under the umbrella of ‘Socrates’ alongside other education related programmes 
(EP & Council, 1995; Maiworm, 2001). In 2007 ERASMUS entered its most recent 
phase of development becoming part of the ‘Lifelong Learning Programme’ that 
integrates the educational with the vocational training programmes (EP & Council, 
2006). 
ERASMUS has grown enormously over the years proving rather popular among 
students. From 3,244 students in 1987 ERASMUS moves now more than 150,000 
students annually (Commission, 2008), and has become the largest organised 
exchange programme in Europe. In addition to the 27 EU member states, ERASMUS 
covers Turkey, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. Thus far almost two million 
students in total have crossed the borders of their country, and the European 
Commission’s goal is to raise this number to three million by 2012 (Europa Press 
Releases, 2006). The most popular ERASMUS destinations are Spain, France, 
Germany, the UK and Italy attracting almost 63 per cent of the total ERASMUS 
population (Commission, 2008). The number of outgoing students, though, does not 
always balance that of the incoming. In the case of the UK, in particular, the ratio 
between incoming and outgoing students is higher than 2:1.
7
                                                 
7 In 2005/06 Britain received 16,395 ERASMUS students and sent only 7,131 (Commission, 2008). 
  7The Commission takes pride in ERASMUS because it ‘stands out as one of the 
most concrete and popular examples of the progress achieved during fifty years of 
European integration’ (Europa Press Releases, 2006).
8 As the Commission president 
José Manuel Barroso said, ‘ERASMUS has developed beyond just being an 
educational programme. It gives many European university students the chance for 
living for the first time in a foreign country, and it has reached the status of a social 
and cultural phenomenon’ (Europa Press Releases, 2006). The truth is that 
ERASMUS was never ‘just an educational programme’. From its inception it was 
expected to play a key role in the promotion of a European identity among the 
younger generations of Europeans. This is clearly reflected in the official objectives 
of the programme, as stated in the original Council Decision of 1987:  
 
The objectives of the ERASMUS programme shall be as follows: (i) to 
achieve a significant increase in the number of students…spending an 
integrated period of study in another Member State, in order that the 
Community may draw upon an adequate pool of manpower with first 
hand experience of economic and social aspects of other Member 
States…; (iv) to strengthen the interaction between citizens in different 
Member States with a view to consolidating the concept of a People’s 
Europe; (v) to ensure the developments of a pool of graduates with 
direct experience of intra-Community cooperation, thereby creating 
the basis upon which intensified cooperation in the economic and 
social sectors can develop at the Community level. (Council, 1987: 21-
2). 
 
Several scholars share the Commission’s assumption that the ERASMUS 
experience abroad and personal contact with other European fosters discreetly but 
firmly a European identity from below (e.g. Fligstein, 2008; Etzioni, 2007; Green, 
2007; Petit, 2007; Lutz et al., 2006; Marks, 1999; Laffan, 1996; Wallace, 1990). 
Nevertheless, there are only two studies, to the best of my knowledge, that attempt to 
measure empirically the ERASMUS effect, and they both suffer from serious 
methodological weaknesses. 
The first study is based on a series of interviews with female students at 
Birmingham University. Krämer-Byrne (2002) argues that ERASMUS students 
realised during the sojourn that they were becoming more European orientated, even 
                                                 
8 ERASMUS has attracted media attention several times. See, for instance, Bennhold (2005), The 
Guardian (2006). In 2002 the ERASMUS student experience was dramatised in the French film 
‘L’Auberge Espagnole’ (‘Pot Luck’ in English). 
  8if this feeling excluded the UK, their host country. However, the small and 
unrepresentative sample of Krämer-Byrne’s (2002) does not allow us to generalise 
from these findings.  
Even a large-scale survey would be inappropriate if it did not measure properly 
the development of European identity over time. As Stroebe et al. (1988: 82) pointed 
out, ‘[s]tudents who choose to study abroad are…a highly selected group, but only 
selected for positive attitudes’. ERASMUS students, therefore, are likely to hold a 
strong European identity prior to the sojourn, and it may even be the reason why they 
choose to study abroad. It is precisely for this reason why we can not accept the 
findings of the second empirical study at face value. King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003) 
maintain that former ERASMUS students are more likely than sedentary graduates to 
identify themselves as partly or exclusively European. However, their survey findings 
are based on a retrospective rather than longitudinal assessment of the ERASMUS 
effect. As I show in the next section, ERASMUS students are indeed more likely to 
have a stronger European self-identity than non-mobile students, but this is not the 
result of the overseas experience per se. 
 
 
FINDINGS FROM A LONGITUDINAL SURVEY ON ERASMUS AND 
EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
The Model and Sample Demographics 
To measure the effect of the ERASMUS experience on students’ European 
identity I conducted a longitudinal survey measuring the attitudes of the same 
individuals at the beginning (pre-test) and the end (post-test) of the academic year 
2003/04. To ensure any observed changes were due to the ERASMUS sojourn rather 
than historical, developmental or cohort factors, the same questionnaire were 
distributed to a control sample of sedentary students. 
The control sample consists of 60 Reading University students who did not go 
abroad during 2003/04, and the ERASMUS sample is divided in two sub-samples 
(Table 1). The incoming group consists of 241 continental European students who 
spent their ERASMUS period in one of nine English universities (Essex, Keele, 
Oxford Brookes, Reading, Southampton, Southampton Solent, Warwick, Western 
England/Bristol, York). The outgoing group consists of 161 students, mostly British, 




Table 1. Sample Demographics 






          
Pre-test Response Rate 
(%) 
24.2   45.8   46.6 
Post-test Response Rate 
(%) 





















          
Age Mean  21.3    21.7   23.4 
  Std. Dev.  5.6    1.2    2.0 
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Source: Author’s own data. 
 
Ideally, in order to fully distinguish variation in the ERASMUS effect between 
countries and nationalities, we would need a pre-test and post-test sample of incoming 
and outgoing students from every European country participating in the programme. 
A large-scale and Europe-wide longitudinal survey, though, comes at a very high cost 
and, therefore, had to be excluded as an option. Hopefully, future research will rectify 
                                                 
9 Panel attrition is inevitable in longitudinal studies (Menard, 1991), but it is only a problem if it 
introduces bias in terms of the dependent variable (Allison, 2002). The missing value analysis 
suggested this is not the case here. 
  10this. Nevertheless, the distinction between outgoing and incoming students here 
allows us to test the hypothesis whether the ERASMUS outcome is conditional on the 
host country choice. Incoming students stayed for a year in Britain, one of the most 
Eurosceptic countries in the EU (McLaren, 2006: 21-30), whereas the majority of the 
outgoing students visited countries less Eurosceptic than the UK.
10 That means that 
environmental influences, regarding European identity development, are more likely 
to be positive amongst the outgoing rather than the incoming sample. 
In the following sections I employ bivariate analysis to test whether the 
ERASMUS experience has a positive effect on students’ knowledge of the host 
country and its culture, and on their European self-identity, pride and attachment. In 
addition, I examine what is more relevant for a positive ERASMUS outcome: the 
original level of students’ European identity or the choice of the host country. 
 
 
Knowledge of the Host Country and its Language  
When ERASMUS was incorporated in 1995 in the ‘Socrates’ programme the 
‘quantitative and qualitative improvement of the knowledge of the languages of the 
European Union’ became one of its official objectives (EP & Council, 1995: 13). The 
encouragement of European language learning was expected to lead ‘to greater 
understanding and solidarity between the peoples of the European Union, and to 
promote the intercultural dimension of education’ (ibid.). At the very least, speaking 
more than one European language is indispensable for communicating with other 
Europeans. Thus, if personal contact and communication with other Europeans can 
foster a European identity, being able to converse in a common language is of 
fundamental importance. Furthermore, the foreign language learning process involves 
learning about the particular foreign culture which is also instrumental in the 
formation of a common European identity. 
The ERASMUS experience should help students to improve their foreign 
language skills in several ways. Firstly, a relatively large number of students study for 
a foreign language/culture degree and usually choose for their ERASMUS sojourn the 
                                                 
10 In virtually all EB surveys British respondents are amongst the least likely to value the EU and 
European integration positively. 
  11host country whose language and culture they study.
11 Secondly, all ERASMUS 
students, regardless of their academic subject, are instructed either in the host country 
language or in another European language. Thirdly, outside the classroom students 
communicate with other Europeans in a language other than their own, which again 
may be the host country language or another major language such as English or 
French. Foreign language improvement, therefore, is integral to the ERASMUS 
experience. 
In addition to the possibility of improving one’s European languages skills, the 
ERASMUS experience gives students the opportunity to familiarise themselves with 
the culture of their host country. Students do not spend all their time in lecture 
theatres, but reserve some for their recreation and for travelling within the host 
country. Their social activities in the new environment should help students to learn 
more about their host country. In short, the ERASMUS experience should promote 
students’ knowledge of their host country and their competence in the host country 
language. 
My survey findings confirm both hypotheses, as Table 2 shows. In line with the 
results of other studies (Maiworm & Teichler, 2002; Krzaklewska & Krupnik, 2006; 
Otero & McCoshan, 2006) both outgoing and incoming ERASMUS students reported 
a statistically significant increase (p<.001) in their host country language competence. 
In a scale from 0 (low) to 6 (high) the linguistic competence mean for the outgoing 
group rose by .74 units from 3.58 to 4.32. Similarly, the average increase among the 
incoming group was from 3.88 to 4.50. The higher pre-test mean probably reflects the 
fact that the host language for the incoming students was English which is very 









                                                 
11 In 2005/06 15.2 per cent of ERASMUS students followed Language and/or Philology degrees 
making it the second largest subject group after Business studies (Commission, 2008). 
  12Table 2. Host Language and Country Knowledge (Paired Sample t-tests) 
Pre-test Post-test  0: Low 
6: High  Mean (SD)  Mean  (SD) 
 
How would you rate your competence in the language of your host country? 
OUT (n=158)  3.58  (1.57)  4.32***  (1.55) 
IN (n=235)  3.88  (.96)  4.50***  (.92) 
 
How much do you know about the country you did your ERASMUS studies? 
OUT (n=158)  4.18  (1.10)  4.61***  (.94) 
IN (n=239)  3.38  (.98)  3.82***  (1.04) 
Note: SD=standard deviation. ***p<.001 (two-tailed).  
Source: Author’s own data. 
 
The outgoing students appeared well informed about the country they would 
spend their ERASMUS period. The pre-test mean for the outgoing students was 4.18, 
whereas for the incoming it was closer to the scale’s midpoint at 3.38 (Table 2). 
Nevertheless, both groups improved their knowledge about the country they visited 
over time. In both samples the increase was statistically significant (p<.001) and 
almost identical in absolute terms. In particular, the post-test country knowledge mean 
reached 4.61 for the outgoing student and 3.82 for the incoming. 
Obviously the host country knowledge and language variables do not apply to the 
control sample, but it is safe to assume the improvement over time in both variables is 
the result of the ERASMUS sojourn. Not only are there strong theoretical reasons to 
expect such an outcome, but it was observed in both ERASMUS samples which 
minimises the possibility of alternative explanations. We can conclude, therefore, the 
ERASMUS programme achieves its objective in promoting European language 
learning and familiarity of other European cultures. Unfortunately, however, the 
survey findings are not as encouraging regarding the programme’s effectiveness to 






  13The ERASMUS Effect on European Identity 
For the measurement of students’ European self-identity, pride and attachment I 
borrowed the questions from the EB surveys number 49 (1998) and 57 (2002) –the 
exact wording can be found in Tables 3 and 4. The self-identity question, which asks 
respondents if they see themselves in terms of their nationality only or also as 
European, is a categorical variable, while the other two variables are handled as 
numeric. The values in the latter variables range from 0, indicating a weak European 
pride or attachment, to a maximum of 6. In addition to the three well-established 
questions measuring European identity, I asked students whether they feel they have 
many things in common with other Europeans. Since ERASMUS is meant to bring 
European students closer to each other and help them realise their culture is part of a 
European family of cultures, we would expect students to realise in the course of their 
sojourn abroad that they have more things in common than they originally thought. 
 
Table 3. In the Near Future Do You See Yourself As…? 
 Control    Outgoing    Incoming 
%  Pre  Post  Pre Post  Pre  Post 
             
Nationality  only  (1)  39.3  35.7  18.9 17.5   2.5  3.7 
Nationality and European (2)  39.3  37.5    53.8  55.2    64.7  63.5 
European and nationality (3)  12.5  17.9    18.2  19.6    29.5  30.7 
European only (4)  3.6  5.4    6.3  5.6    2.1  1.2 
Missing  5.4  3.6  2.8 2.1  1.2  .8 
             
Primarily European  (3+4)  16.1  23.3    24.5  25.2    31.6  31.9 
Primarily Nationality (1+2)  78.6  73.2    72.7  72.7    67.2  67.2 
             
MH Test Sig. (two-tailed)  .223    .677    .638 
N 56    143    241 
          
Notes: MH= Marginal Homogeneity. Only responses from British students in the Control and 
Outgoing categories are reported. 
Source: Author’s own data. 
 
Against popular expectations, I find no evidence that the ERASMUS experience 
leads students to adopt a European self-identity. On the contrary, what is clear is that 
ERASMUS students are more likely to see themselves as primarily European, that is, 
European only or first European and then nationals of their country, than non-mobile 
students, but not because of the study abroad experience itself. As we can see in Table 
3, there are no statistically significant changes over time in any of the samples. 
  14Virtually as many outgoing and incoming students continued to identify themselves 
they way they did at the start of the ERASMUS sojourn. What is also interesting, but 
not surprising, is that British students are more likely, compared to their continental 
peers, to profess an exclusive national or European self-identity (cf. Cinnirella, 1997).  
 
Table 4. European Pride, Attachment and Commonalities (Paired Sample t-tests) 
Pre-test Post-test  0: Low 
6: High  Mean  (SD) Mean (SD) 
 
Are you proud of being European? 
 
CONTROL  (n=59)  2.73  (1.64) 3.08* (1.68) 
OUT (n=156)  4.04  (1.41)  4.14  (1.56) 
IN  (n=234)  4.31 (1.43) 4.00** (1.52) 
 
How attached do you feel to Europe? 
 
CONTROL (n=60)  2.57  (1.36)  2.60  (1.38) 
OUT  (n=160)  3.51  (1.28) 3.72* (1.43) 
IN (n=231)  3.90  (1.18)  3.82  (1.36) 
 
How many things do you feel you have in common with other Europeans? 
CONTROL (n=60)  3.12  (1.24)  3.22  (1.20) 
OUT  (n=158)  3.64  (1.01) 3.93*** (1.06) 
IN (n=238)  3.83  (.78)  3.94  (.85) 
 
Notes: SD=standard deviation. *p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed). 
Source: Author’s own data. 
 
 
Table 4 compares the European pride, attachment and commonalities pre-test and 
post-test means and exhibits some intriguing results. Again contrary to conventional 
wisdom, ERASMUS does not strengthen students’ European pride. Moreover, if the 
ERASMUS experience in continental Europe simply had no effect on outgoing 
students’ European pride, it had a negative impact among incoming students. From 
4.31 the incoming European pride mean fell to 4.00 over time, a statistically 
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12 This result, in combination with the development of the 
other two variable means, suggests the ERASMUS experience in England may be 
counterproductive in terms of European identity growth. In particular, while the 
ERASMUS sojourn in continental Europe helps outgoing students to feel more 
attached to Europe and acknowledge more commonalities with other Europeans, it has 
no such effect in England.  
Before we can be more confident that the ERASMUS outcome is likely to differ 
between countries, possibly because of, for instance, the influence of Eurosceptic 
media or other environmental parameters, we need to address the possibility of a 
ceiling effect. Stroebe et al. (1988) asserted that mobile students are a self-selected 
group, and usually there is more room for deterioration rather than improvement in 
their attitudes towards their host nation. In Tables 3 and 4 we can see that 
ERASMUS, and in particular incoming, students are more likely to hold a European 
identity which may be the reason why the sojourn did not have an effect on European 
self-identity and a negative one on incoming students’ European pride. 
A simple way to check for a potential ceiling effect is to divide the samples into 
‘Eurosceptics’ and ‘Europhiles’ and compare the development of the means over 
time. If a ceiling effect does obstruct European identity growth and the choice of host 
country is irrelevant, we should see both outgoing and incoming students with low 
levels of pre-test European identity to report an increase over time. Likewise, 
ERASMUS students with particularly strong European identity should see their 
European identity weaken over the sojourn. However, the statistical artefact known as 
regression to the mean needs to be taken into consideration. Kelly & Price (2005) 
explain that when the correlation between different time measurements is less than 
perfect, respondents with values below the mean in the pre-test period will, on 
average, have higher values in the post-test period and vice versa. In order to avoid 
the regression fallacy and mistakenly interpret the result as a ceiling effect, it is 
necessary to observe there are no statistically significant changes in the control 
sample. 
 
                                                 
12 Notice the European pride mean in the control sample moves in a different direction than the mean in 
the incoming sample. Hence, we can conclude the ERASMUS experience in England had actually a 
negative impact on students’ European pride. 
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t-tests) 
Pre-test Post-test  0: Low 
6: High  Mean  (SD) Mean (SD) 
 
Are you proud of being European? 
 
CONTROL  (n=40)  1.85 (1.12) 2.38** (1.46) 
OUT (n=53)  2.47  (.91)  3.00**  (1.53) 
IN (n=62)  2.39  (1.01)  2.68  (1.55) 
 
How attached do you feel to Europe? 
 
CONTROL  (n=43)  1.93  (1.01) 2.35* (1.40) 
OUT (n=77)  2.47  (.80)  2.91**  (1.24) 
IN (n=83)  2.61  (.68)  3.17***  (1.31) 
 
How many things do you feel you have in common with other Europeans? 
CONTROL (n=36)  2.28  (.78)  2.75*  (1.13) 
OUT (n=62)  2.60  (.64)  3.29***  (1.09) 
IN  (n=74)  2.86  (.38) 3.51*** (.93) 
 
Notes: Eurosceptics are respondents with pre-test values below or equal to three (Yt-1 ≤ 3). 
SD=standard deviation. *p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed). 
Source: Author’s own data. 
 
 
If we return to Table 3 we notice that those students who see themselves 
exclusively as European or as nationals of their country only did not change their 
mind over time. In other words, a ceiling effect does not apply to the European self-
identity variable.
13 The t-tests in Table 5 show that there is a statistically significant 
increase for nearly all students with a pre-test value below the scale midpoint, 
regardless if they are ERASMUS or not. The sole exception are the incoming students 
who fail to show any signs of European pride growth, even if their original European 
pride levels are rather low. It seems, therefore, ERASMUS does not have a greater 
effect among students with a weak European identity. Consequently, outgoing 
students did not feel more attached to Europe simply because their original European 
                                                 
13 Unless an equal number of respondents shifted from one response category to another, which is very 
unlikely, the percentages between the pre-test and post-test periods remained virtually identical because 
the same individuals opted for the same responses. 
  17attachment was very weak; it was the ERASMUS experience itself that fostered this 
change. 
 
Table 6. European Pride, Attachment and Commonalities among Europhiles (Paired Sample t-
tests) 
Pre-test Post-test  0: Low 
6: High  Mean  (SD) Mean (SD) 
 
Are you proud of being European? 
 
CONTROL (n=19)  4.58  (.77)  4.58  (1.02) 
OUT (n=103)  4.84  (.83)  4.73  (1.21) 
IN (n=172)  5.00  (.77)  4.48***  (1.19) 
 
How attached do you feel to Europe? 
 
CONTROL (n=17)  4.18  (.53)  3.24**  (1.15) 
OUT (n=79)  4.52  (.73)  4.51  (1.13) 
IN (n=148)  4.62  (.68)  4.18***  (1.25) 
 
How many things do you feel you have in common with other Europeans? 
CONTROL  (n=24)  4.38  (.50) 3.92* (.93) 
OUT (n=96)  4.31  (.49)  4.34  (.81) 
IN  (n=164)  4.26  (.46) 4.13* (.74) 
 
Notes: Europhiles are respondents with pre-test values above three (Yt-1 > 3). SD=standard 
deviation. *p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed). 
Source: Author’s own data. 
 
 
Likewise, we can argue that it was the ERASMUS experience in England, in 
particular, that led incoming students reappraise their European pride downwards. The 
t-tests on the Europhile sub-samples in Table 6 confirm this. More than half of 
outgoing students felt very proud to be European at the beginning of their sojourn, but 
there are no signs of a statistically significant decrease over time. The opposite is true 
for the incoming students: the European pride mean fell from 5.00 to 4.48 which is a 
statistically significant decrease (p<.001). With regard to European attachment and 
commonalities it is again only incoming Europhile students who reported a decline 
during the sojourn. However, the statistically significant change among the control 
  18group suggests the reason behind the falling means in the incoming sample is 
regression to the mean rather than anything else. Thus, a ceiling effect is only to a 
limited extend responsible for the lack of European identity growth over time.  
Given the evidence presented here, the Commission has every interest to reverse 
the ERASMUS student flow imbalance in Britain. As long as the ERASMUS 
experience in Britain does not enhance a European identity and any positive effects 
are confined to the outgoing students, it is unfortunate that Britain receives more 
ERASMUS students than it sends. Even worse, the number of British ERASMUS 
students has been falling for over ten years now. According to the Commission (2008) 
data, outgoing mobility in Britain reached its apogee in 1994/95 with 11,988 students. 
However, by 2005/06 there were only 7,131 outgoing students, a drop of 41 per cent. 
As a result of this trend, British universities have been keen to reduce the intake of 
ERASMUS students, which may not be too bad an idea from a European identity 
development perspective. Overall, if ERASMUS is to play any role in the 
dissemination of a European identity it is not enough to leave things in chance. On the 
contrary, what is needed is to strengthen mobility to and from those countries where 
the inter-cultural sojourn is most likely to have a positive impact on students’ 




Whether ERASMUS is really a success story or not depends, ultimately, on one’s 
standpoint and expectations. Leaving other pedagogical dimensions aside, the study 
abroad experience helped ERASMUS students to familiarise themselves with another 
European country and culture. Equally, it enabled them to practise their foreign 
language skills and, in particular, to improve their competence in the host country 
language. Both these developments are good reasons for the European Commission 
and the national authorities to praise the value of the ERASMUS programme. 
If, however, ERASMUS is seen as the secret weapon that will convert young 
Brits, French, Greeks, and so on, to archetypal European citizens with a strong sense 
of European identity, one is bound to be disappointed. The findings from the 
longitudinal survey confirm that mobile students are more likely to hold a European 
identity, but not because of the mobility experience itself. The ERASMUS sojourn 
failed to instil a European self-identity or enhance students’ European pride. On the 
  19contrary, continental Europeans felt, on average, less proud to be European at the end 
of their sojourn in England. Similarly, it was only outgoing ERASMUS students who 
strengthened their attachment to Europe and who reported an increase in terms of 
perceived commonalities with other Europeans. 
Finally, I showed that a ceiling effect played only a limited role in the particular 
ERASMUS outcome. What is more important is the host country choice. 
Unfortunately, the outgoing sample is not large enough to examine the ERASMUS 
effect in each European country individually. Nevertheless, the countries the outgoing 
students visited were all less Eurosceptic than Britain which may be the reason why 
only outgoing students felt more attached to Europe and acknowledged more 
commonalities with other Europeans. Future research will hopefully shed more light 
on the question of environmental influences, and allow us to determine why the 
ERASMUS experience varies between countries and, furthermore, in which countries 
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